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THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE'S APPROACH
TO THE GRAY MARKET DOES IT INFRINGE ON THE PURPOSES
OF TRADEMARK PROTECTION?

E. John KRUMHOLTZ *

Although the Tariff Act of 1930 and the Lanham Act prohibit the importation of genuine goods
bearing registered U.S. trademarkswithout the consent of the U.S. mark owner, the Customs Service's
regulations allow such imports where the domestic andforeign trademark owners are related entities.
The Customs Service's emphasis on the domestic and foreign owner's relationshipis inconsistent with
the trademarkdoctrine of territoriality.According to this principle,the trademarkmay have a separate
legal existence in each country where it is registeredby establishingseparateand independent goodwill
for the mark. Where such independent goodwill has been established, import restrictions on gray
market goods are a necessary and proper mechanism of trademark protection regardless of the
relationshipbetween the U.S. markholder and its foreign counterpart.
Trade-marks, it has been truthfully said, are the only means by which the manufacturer and the merchant are enabled to inspire and retain public conlidence in the
quality and integrity of things made and sold, and the only means by which the
public is protected against the frauds and impositions of the crafty and designing
who are always alert to appropriate to themselves the fruits of the reputation of
others [11.

1. Introduction

The extension of trademark protection to require the exclusion of gray
market imports has long been the subject of debate [2]. Gray market, or
parallel, imports are goods bearing genuine [3] trademarks that are manufactured or distributed abroad and then imported into the United States without

the consent of the registered United States trademark owner [4]. Given
disparities between the domestic price of a good and the price paid abroad as
well as fluctuations in the exchange rates, unauthorized importers may purchase
large quantities of the product abroad, import the goods into the United
States, and sell them to retailers and distributors at a discount [5]. These

imports are sold on what is known as the "gray market" because these retailers
*
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and distributors are in turn able to sell the merchandise at a lower price than
that of an authorized dealer [6].
The strength of the dollar outside the United States in 1982-1983 resulted
in a large increase in gray market activity [7]. Recent litigation [8] and renewed
governmental interest [9] have heightened the debate between trademark
owners and parallel importers over what protection, if any, should be afforded
the U.S. mark. Despite the importance of the question, the legislative [10] and
judicial [11] guidance in the area has been far from clear. In the face of this
ambiguous guidance, the United States Customs Services (Customs) administration of the laws dealing with parallel imports has been too restrictive in
protecting the rights of U.S. mark owners [12]. Given Customs' current
interpretation of the applicable statutes, "[t]he U.S. registrant seeking to
prevent importation or sale of genuine goods may face an uphill struggle to
convince a court that it is entitled to injunctive relief" [13].
Based on the principle of territoriality, the modern theory of trademark
protection recognizes that the same trademark may have a separate and
independent existence in each country where it is registered. By applying this
theory of trademark protection to the issue of parallel imports [14], this article
identifies the problems of Customs' current approach to the gray market. This
article evaluates whether import restrictions on gray market goods are necessary in light of modem trademark theory. Section 2 gives an overview of the
purposes of trademark protection and considers the scope of trademark rights
in the international marketplace. Section 3 examines the relevant statutory
provisions governing the importation of genuine goods - section 526 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 [15] and section 42 of the Lanham Act [16] - and the
Customs Service's current interpretation and enforcement of these provisions
[17]. The article then considers the relief from parallel imports available to the
domestic trademark holder in light of the various rationales used to support
the existing regulations.
In emphasizing the relationship between the foreign and domestic markholders, this article argues that Customs' approach fails to take into account
that identical marks in two countries may symbolize separate and independent
goodwill in each country [18]. Modern trademark theory, therefore, should
require the exclusion of gray market imports regardless of the U.S. trademark
owner's relationship with its foreign counterpart whenever a separate goodwill
has been established.

2. The Theory of Trademark Protection
A trademark is "any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination
thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods
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and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others" [19]. The
property right that is vested in a trademark is of immense value to the
trademark owner who "is entitled to the protection which the highest powers
of the courts can afford" [20]. The safeguarding of this right, in turn,
"[protects] the public from deceit, [fosters] fair competition, and [secures] to
the business community the advantages of reputation and good will by
preventing their diversion from those who have created them to those who
have not" [21].
2.1. The Purposes of Trademark Protection
Three separate and distinct interests are promoted by the protection of
trademarks [22]. By identifying the product and its manufacturer, trademarks
become a guarantee of a particular standard of quality and enable consumers
to identify the product of a specific manufacturer or distributor [23]. Consequently, courts prohibit the sale of goods that could deceive consumers as to
the source of the merchandise [24].
Secondly, protection of trademarks safeguards the trademark owner. Besides symbolizing the quality of the merchandise, a trademark also represents
the goodwill generated by the trademark owner [25]. This protects the markholder from the sale of another's product as the holder's own. "Where the
owner of a trademark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the
public the product, he is protected in his investment from misappropriation by
pirates and cheats" [26]. This becomes an "intangible asset" entitling the
trademark to legal protection from acts that injure its value [27].
Finally, trademark protection promotes free competition [28]. Trademarks
improve consumer awareness by acting as "instruments of identification and
demand creation" [29]. This enhanced awareness enables purchasers "to
distinguish [between] the goods of competing producers and thus to make an
informed choice based on the differences in quality between competitively
produced or marketed articles" [30]. Moreover, such consumer awareness
encourages producers and distributors to develop better products in order to
maintain their position in a highly competitive market economy [31].
2.2 The Scope of Trademark Protection
With the advent of trademarks as a means of identifying the product and its
manufacturer, it became necessary to define the scope of the trademark
owner's property right and, in particular, to determine how far this right
extends outside the country of the trademark's origin. In the landmark
decision, Appollinaris Co. v. Scherer [32], the principle of universality of
trademarks was established when the court rejected an attempt to create a
territorial title to a trademarked product [33].
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Under this principle, a product bearing a genuine and lawfully affixed
trademark can carry that mark anywhere in the world without infringing upon
the rights of another owner of the same mark in another country [34].
Applying this principle to parallel imports, a U.S. assignee of the trademark
rights could sue a foreign assignor for a breach of contract or unfair competition, but if a third party, not subject to any contractual agreement, imported
the genuine product, the U.S. registrant was considered powerless [35].
The concept of universality, however, was based upon an idealistic view of
the world as a single marketplace and was, therefore, inadequate given the
realities of the modern global economy [36]. The principle failed to take into
account that the establishment of trademark rights in two countries would
inevitably conflict if either or both sets of rights were thought to extend
universally [37]. Besides this failure to recognize that a trademark has a
separate legal status in the various countries in which it is registered, the
universality principle also did not contemplate the possibility that the goodwill
represented by the mark may be different in various countries [38].
U.S. courts applied the universality principal in cases of unauthorized,
genuine imports until the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in A. Bourjois & Co.
v. Katzel [39]. In Katzel, a foreign manufacturer of face powder sold the
plaintiff the right to use its mark and distribute its product in the United
States [40]. By investing "substantial sums of money" [411, the plaintiff
"succeeded in creating a wide market in the United States for its product" [42]
as well as "an excellent business reputation for the character of its goods" [43].
At the same time, the defendant Katzel could buy the identical powder
bearing the same trademark directly from the French manufacturer, import it
to the United States, and sell it at a profit [44].
In a much cited decision, the Supreme Court rejected the universality
principle that had been applied by the Second Circuit and adopted the
concept of territoriality [45]. Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes reasoned
that the trademark owned by the U.S. assignee is not the same mark as the one
owned by the French producer of the powder [46]. In holding that a trademark
has a separate legal existence under each country's law, the Court found that
the mark can symbolize the local goodwill established by its domestic owner
[47].
Two important concepts emerge from the territoriality principle. First, a
trademark has a separate legal existence under the laws of each nation where it
is registered [48]. Second, the primary purpose of the mark is to symbolize the
local goodwill generated by the domestic registrant [49). Today it is well
settled that the territoriality principle and the ideas that it incorporates have
discredited the theory of universality [50].
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3. Existing Relief from Gray Market Imports Available to the Domestic
Trademark Owner
3.1. Legislative Treatment of ParallelImports
The primary statute dealing with the problem of parallel imports is section
526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (section 526), which prohibits unauthorized
importation of goods bearing a registered U.S. trademark [51]. Since its
enactment, the scope of the protection that the provision offers has been
debated by importers and domestic trademark registrants (52].
Although the legislative history of the section is sparse [53], commentators
supporting parallel importation argue that section 526 was a "direct result" of
the Second Circuit's decision in Katzel [541 and that protection from genuine
imports is available only in situations factually similar to Katzel [55]. They
have concluded that Congress intended section 526 to apply "only to independent American companies" [56], not those related to their foreign counterparts.
In contrast, trademark owners emphasize the plain language of the provision. Although recognizing that Congress enacted section 526 in response to
the Second Circuit's opinion in Katzel, those who favor restrictions on parallel
imports claim that this fact "does not settle the scope of the Act" [57]. They
interpret the legislative history as showing that "the underlying policy of
section 526(a) was to preserve the role of trademarks as 'protection of one's
goodwill in the trade' " [58]. To implement this policy, it is argued that the
language of section 526 be interpreted literally to protect all registered owners
of U.S. trademarks [59].
A second statutory provision invoked by trademark registrants in cases
dealing with parallel imports is section 42 of the Lanham Act (section 42) [60].
Under this provision, imports that "copy or simulate" [61] goods bearing a
registered U.S. trademark are prohibited. Although parallel imports are genuine
goods [62], the words "copy or simulate" have been interpreted to apply to
such genuine merchandise [63]. Enacted in 1946, the scope of protection
afforded the trademark owner by section 42 seems inconsistent with its
counterpart in the Tariff Act [64]. Unlike section 526, section 42 offers
protection from parallel imports to all U.S. trademark registrants. not only
those that are U.S. citizens or corporations [65]. Thus, under section 42, a
foreign corporation may register its mark in its own name and still enjoy that
provision's protection. Moreover, unlike section 42, section 526 provides an
exception to its general rule of excluding genuine imports when the importer
has written consent from the U.S. trademark registrant [66]. Section 526 also
allows the entry of genuine imports when the mark has been obliterated from
the prQduct [67]. In light of such inconsistencies, "it is not clear whether
[section 42] was designed to repeal or supplement [section 526]" [68].
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3.2. Customs' enforcement of section 526 and section 42
Charged with the enforcement of section 526 and section 42, Customs has
had to "fill the vacuum of statutory interpretation" [69] resulting from the
lack of legislative [70] and judicial [71] guidance. The present regulations, first
adopted in 1972, represent Customs' current interpretation of the legislative
intent behind these two provisions. Under these regulations Customs will deny
the protection authorized in section 526 and section 42 if:
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are owned by the same
person or business entity;
(2) The foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent and
subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common ownership or control
[as defined in 19 C.F.R. § 133.2(d)];
(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or trade name
applied under authorization of the U.S. owner.. .[72].

If the relationship between the domestic and the foreign mark owners is one of
the above, the U.S. registrant will be unable to stop the importation of gray
market goods "regardless of xvhether [it] has developed a separate good will"
[73].
To implement this policy, Customs' regulations are designed to determine
the relationship between the U.S. trademark owner and foreign firms [74]. An
application to record a trademark with Customs [75] must identify "any
parent or subsidiary company or other foreign company under common
ownership or control which uses the trademark abroad" [76]. Although Customs
does not look behind the representations of independence made by the U.S.
registrant, such representations are open to attack by third parties [77].

4. An Analysis of Customs' Current Approach to Gray Market Imports
4.1. Customs' Regulations and the Relevant TrademarkPolicies
One justification for Customs' approach is that, when a close relationship
between the domestic and foreign markholders exists, the importation of
genuine goods does not infringe upon the U.S. registrant's trademark rights
[78]. When the U.S. trademark owner is part of a single international enterprise or is the originator of the mark and has authorized its foreign use,
parallel importers argue that "[t]he rationale underlying trademark protection
does not support the exclusion of genuine products" [79]. They contend that in
both situations there is "no likelihood of confusion, false designation of
origin, [or] dilution" [80] of the mark from gray market imports because
consumers will not be deceived by genuine parallel imports, and the importation will result in no injury to the mark's goodwill and reputation [81]. By
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contrast, an independent U.S. registrant is able to vary the quality of its
product and, therefore, must be protected from the importation of inferior
goods bearing the same trademark [82].
This rationale fails to take into account the established trademark principle
of territoriality and is "based on the theory of universality, which ignores the
independent goodwill the trademark can represent in separate national
markets" [83].
Under the principle of territoriality, the same trademark has a different
legal existence in each country where it is registered, and the mark symbolizes
the local goodwill that the domestic mark owner has generated [84]. This
goodwill reflects an investment of time, energy, and money on the part of the
domestic owner of the mark in building a reputation for the product [85]. A
simple example demonstrates that this separate goodwill is created regardless
of the U.S. owner's relationship with its foreign counterpart. Suppose a U.S.
corporation is the subsidiary of a large international enterprise and under its
control [86]. The corporation distributes a particular product and is the
registered U.S. owner of that product's trademark [871. The subsidiary has
developed an extensive program of advertising and warranty services to attract
consumers because the U.S. market for this good is highly competitive. The
parent corporation, in contrast, does not need this kind of program to market
the product in its less competitive overseas market.
Over time, U.S. consumers expect a certain style and quality as well as the
assurance of the domestic registrant's warranty services when purchasing the
product [881. At the same time, however, the foreign corporation has developed an entire range of style and quality to cater to the particular local tastes.
This illustrates that a domestic owner of the mark can establish a separate and
independent goodwill for the product even though it is part of a single
international enterprise.
Having established an independent goodwill for its mark, the U.S. trademark owner, regardless of its relationship to the foreign entity, is vulnerable to
competition from gray market activity [89]. If not excluded from importation,
gray market goods that were never intended for the U.S. market will reach
U.S. consumers who will continue to attribute the product to the domestic
trademark owner [90]. If the import is of an inferior quality or of a style that
fails to meet the consumers' demand, it will cause confusion and, inevitably,
injury to the national goodwill for the product [91]. Besides causing such
injury to the U.S. markholder, the gray market importer can take advantage of
the trademark's local goodwill [92]. This "free rider" phenomenon "deprives
[the U.S. mark owner] of the benefit of its goodwill [to] which it is legally
entitled" [93].
This argument was used by the court in Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo [94].
Osawa, the registered domestic trademark owner and distributor of high-quality foreign manufactured Mamiya photographic equipment [95], initiated the
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action to enjoin a discount camera dealer from independently importing and
dealing in equipment under the Mamiya mark [96]. In an opinion sensitive to
trademark policy, the court found that Osawa had developed a substantial
goodwill "separate and distinct from the goodwill emanating in the branded
goods themselves" [97]. This goodwill was established through an extensive
advertising program, free warranty repairs,.and other public relations activities
[98]. According to the court, the gray market importers, who advertise little
[99] and offer no warranty repairs [100], free ride on Osawa's efforts to build a
reputation for its products [101]. The court reasoned that the unwary consumers purchasing the gray market equipment would believe that it is backed
by Osawa's reputation [102]. The realization that their purchases lack the
Osawa warranty protection or do not provide the advantages of Osawa's other
promotional activities would result in confusion and, inevitably, damage to the
reputation of the mark [103].
By limiting protection under section 526 and section 42 to independent
U.S. trademark registrants Customs' regulations fail to protect the investment
made by a mark owner who has a business relationship with its foreign
counterpart. Under the territoriality principle, both independent and affiliated
trademark owners' investments are recognized as creating a separate and
independent goodwill [104]. Nevertheless, by protecting only one of these
goodwills, the regulations leave the other to be destroyed by "suicidal competition" [105] from imports bearing the same mark. The notion of fair competition "requires that those who invest time, money, and energy into the
development of goodwill and a favorable reputation be allowed to reap the
advantages of their investment" [106].
The effect of the regulations' failure to take into account the principle of
territoriality could be of substantial consequence to U.S. consumers [107].
Although consumers pay less for gray market products [108], such activity is
only in the public interest in the short run [109]. Continued importation of
such goods will eventually lead to reduced investments in trademarks as
businesses lose the incentive to invest time and money in establishing an
unprotected goodwill [110]. With fewer trademarks, consumers will be unable
to distinguish between different brands and to reward quality with continued
purchases [111]. The lack of consumer loyalty to quality will lead to manufacturers having less incentive to develop high quality goods, and distributors less
incentive to offer special services and warranties [112].
4.2. Prevention of Antitrust Violations
Customs' denial of gray market relief to related companies has also been
justified under the rubric of the Sherman Antitrust Act [113]. Gray market
proponents argue that if a domestic trademark owner, related to its foreign
counterpart, is allowed to exclude genuine imports, the domestic business
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enterprise would be able to use its trademark right as "a vertical, territorial
restraint on the worldwide flow of [goods]" [114].
This argument is premised upon the belief that if the domestic owner of the
trademark could stop the importation of the genuine goods which would
compete in the U.S. market, it would be able to set an artificially high price
for its product [115]. By limiting the protection available under section 526
and section 42 to independent U.S. trademark owners, the Customs regulations are seen as ensuring a certain degree of price competition and encouraging lower prices for consumers [116].
This reasoning was recently adopted by the court in Parfums Stern, Inc. v.
United Slates Customs Service [117]. In Parfums, the plaintiff was part of an
international business enterprise that holds the trademark for well known
fragrance products [118]. The court declined to enjoin the importation of gray
market goods, emphasizing the relationship between the domestic and foreign
mark holders. In addition, the court considered the plaintiff's attempt to
restrain parallel imports as an attempt to "monopolize" the market [1191.
This argument, however, presumes too much of the powers of the U.S.
Customs Service [120]. In issuing the current set of regulations, Customs has
attempted "to implement its perception of antitrust policy" [121]. Nothing in
either section 526 or section 42, however; suggests that Congress granted such
authority to the agency [122]. Customs' approach to the related companies
problem illustrates its ineffectiveness as an antitrust enforcement agency.
This ineffectiveness stems from regulations that presume an antitrust violation by affiliated companies without taking into account the relevant market
considerations [123]. Relying only on the fact that the domestic and foreign
trademark owners are related, the regulations focus on intra-brand competition and fail to consider the product market as a whole [124]. This approach
uses a method - a market construct based solely on the sales of a single
trademarked product [125] - which the United States Supreme Court has
rejected as being narrow and artificial when considering possible antitrust
liability [126].
Customs' inability to enforce antitrust policy is further evidenced by the
regulations' failure to consider the reasonableness of any restraint of trade
resulting from the exclusion of genuine goods. Although the exclusion of
parallel imports by affiliated companies would, as it is argued, constitute a
restraint of trade such restraints may be reasonable given the global economy
[127]. U.S. law has previously sanctioned territorial restraints as "reasonable
instruments in the orderly marketing of goods" [128] in the marketplace.
Furthermore, the claim that such restraints will enable the U.S. registrant to
charge an artificially high price for its product fails to consider the wide range
of legitimate causes for disparities between the foreign and domestic price.
There are many reasons why the domestic price might be higher than the
overseas price for the same good. For example, less expensive components,
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whose use is prohibited in the United States, may be used by the foreign
manufacturer [129].
If, however, the restraint of trade resulting from the exclusion of parallel
imports is unreasonable or the price set by the domestic trademark holder still
appears artificially high after taking into account legitimate cost differentials,
remedies that are more appropriate than Customs' per se rule [130] of antitrust
violation are available [131]. Such remedies would include an exclusion action
under the antitrust laws, suits for unfair competition, and actions that challenge the validity of the trademark [132]. Any of these are more effective than
Customs' blanket denial of protection to affiliated companies because these
remedies may be used against any U.S. registrant regardless of its relationship
with its foreign counterpart.
4.3. Protectionfrom the Foreign Trademark Owner
A third rationale that has been used to justify customs' interpretation of
section 526 and section 42 is protecting the domestic registrant from competition by the foreign mark holder [133]. Once the foreign trademark owner has
assigned its rights to a domestic firm in the U.S. market, any subsequent
attempt to export its product to the United States would be considered a fraud
upon that assignment [134]. If, however, the U.S. registrant is the foreign mark
holder, or a U.S. firm under foreign ownership, gray market importers argue
that the rationale for exclusion does not apply and that the importation of
such goods would work no fraud upon the domestic trademark owner [135].
The Court of International Trade relied on this justification in Vivitar
Corporation v. United States [136]. Vivitar, the domestic registrant of a
trademark for high-quality photographic equipment, had authorized foreign
manufacturers to apply its mark to their products [137]. Because of favorable
exchange rates, third parties were able to purchase the foreign-made equipment
abroad and import it back into the United States at a profit [138]. In rejecting
Vivitar's claim that section 526 provides a U.S. trademark owner with an
"'unqualified right" [139] to exclude such imports, the court reasoned that the
provision was enacted as "a special remedy to protect American businesses
that purchase foreign trademarks from imports that violate the rights the
American businesses purchase" [140]. The court concluded that Customs'
denial of protection to Vivitar was justified since Vivitar had authorized the
foreign application of the mark [141].
Although the case was affirmed, the Federal Circuit narrowed the basis of
the holding. The court reasoned that, although Customs regulations are not
invalid for reducing the scope of the U.S. mark owner's protection [142],
Customs' determination has no affect on a trademark owner's right to obtain a
judicial determination' of a trademark infringement [143]. Moreover, the
determination of whether gray market imports violate section 526 is to be
decided on a case-by-case basis [144].
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The reasoning of both courts, however, is based on an interpretation of
congressional intent that is contrary to the plain language of the statutes [145].
As the Customs Service, itself, argued in a joint amicus curiae brief filed with
the Justice Department in a recent gray market case:
nothing in the language of [section 526 and section 42]...expressly limits the
exclusionary right conferred to U.S. firms that are independent of owners of
identical foreign marks. Rather. the relevant language in [the] statutory provisions
purports to confer the exclusionary rights awarded to all owners of U.S. trademarks

[146].

The brief states that "neither the legislative reports nor the congressional
debate contain any clear evidence of a legislative intent to deny trademark
protection where the owner of the U.S. mark is owned or controlled by a
foreign manufacturer of the trademarked goods" [147]. In light of the language
and legislative history of the provisions excluding gray market goods, there
appears to be no legislative justification for the regulations [148]. Moreover,
the case-by-case methodology runs contrary to the clear language of the
statutes: there is nothing either in the statute or in the legislative history that
indicates Congress' intent to let the courts read exceptions into the statute's
clear language based on factual circumstances.

5. Conclusion
The plain language of both section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and
section 42 of the Lanham Act provides protection to U.S. trademark owners
from the unauthorized importation of goods bearing their mark. This protection has been limited to U.S. registrants independent from the foreign owner
of the mark. Customs' imposition of restrictions raises several difficult issues.
By changing the scope of the section 526 and section 42 protection, Customs
has ventured far from the plain language of the statutes. Furthermore,
Customs should not be allowed to implement its own notion of antitrust
policy by enforcing a blanket rule that fails to consider market realities.
Although these issues are essential in examining the current approach to
parallel imports, the most decisive question arises in the context of modern
trademark theory. By denying protection to trademark owners that are related
to their foreign counterparts or have consented to the foreign use of their
mark, the regulations fail to recognize that a separate and independent
goodwill may have been established by the domestic mark owner regardlessof
its affiliation with the foreign registrant. The possibility of the existence of a
national goodwill for the mark has been firmly established by the modern
trademark principle of territoriality. In rejecting this possibility, the existing
regulations represent a regression to the outdated concept of universality [149].
In addition, Customs' failure to protect the goodwill of certain U.S.
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trademark owners is contrary to the very purpose of trademark protection. A
trademark does more than act as an instrument of identification. Where the
mark holder has invested time, energy, and money in building the reputation
of its product, the trademark becomes the symbol of this goodwill. By leaving
this mark and the goodwill it represents unprotected, the existing regulations
deprive the trademark owner of any return on investment. Inevitably, businesses will no longer have the incentive to invest in the establishment of a
mark for their goods, and consumers will be left without one of their principle
means of distinguishing between products and rewarding quality with continued purchases.
The plain language of section 526 and section 42 provides for import
restrictions on gray market goods. Import restrictions are a necessary and
proper mechanism of trademark protection regardless of the relationship
between the various owners of an international mark. Customs' emphasis on
such relationships is unwarranted and may be economically detrimental. For
this reason, the existing Customs regulations would be repealed. The precision
of these regulations would not leave the gray market importer totally unprotected, as it may challenge the validity or ownership of the trademark in court.
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[41 Takamatsu. ParallelImportationof TrademarkedGoods: A ComparativeAnalysis. 57 Wash.
L. Rev. 433 (1982).
[5] For a description of the practices involved, see Vivitar Corp. v. United States. 593 F. Supp.
420. 422-23 (Ct. Int'l. Trade 1984). offd.. 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985): Batteries.supra note 2.
at 5: Supnik. The Bell & Howell: Manuva Case - Where Now ParallelImports?. 74 Trade-Mark
Rep. 1. 2 (1984) ("As a result of fluctuations in currency exchange rates, it sometimes becomes
possible to purchase goods in certain foreign countries and to import them to the United States
for less than the price charged for sales direct from the manufacturer....").
[6] Supnik. supra note 5. at 3: see also Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1170 ("[G]ray marketers
operate at (or outside) the fringes of legality. Their operations are in large part held in
secrecy...."). Many U.S. industries are affected by this pattern of unauthorized imports. Those
facing the greatest damage are the photographic equipment, fragrance and cosmetic, watch, and
electronic industries. These four industries alone account for approximately $700 million in
annual sales lost to parallel imports. The Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American
Trademarks. The Economic Impact of Diversion: A Study of Gray Market Goods and Their
Effect on United States Trademark Owners. United States Retail Dealers and the American
Consumers 36-39 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Economic Impact].
[7] The data in the following table reflects the increase in lost sales that 26 companies
surveyed experienced between 1982 and 1983:
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Estimated annual sales lost to sales of diverted goods. 1982 and 1983 ($000)

Total

%Change

1982

1983

$48 250

S58 860

22

46270

67550

46

22070
13 100

32 440
17 800

47
36

$129 690

$176 650

36

Photographic equipment
industry respondents
Fragrance and cosmetic
industry respondents
Watch and clock
industry respondents
Other industries

Economic Impact, supra note 6, at 34.
[8] See, e.g., Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1552; Osaira. 589 F. Supp. at 1163; Parfism Stern. 575 F.
Supp. At 416.
[9] The Working Group on Intellectual Property of the Cabinet Council on Commerce and
Trade has recently reviewed data concerning the problem of parallel imports. See Certain
Importations Bearing Recorded U.S. Trademarks; Solicitation of Economic Data, 49 Fed. Reg.
21, 453 (1984).
[10] See Bell & Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1065. For a discussion of the legislative treatment of
parallel imports, see infra text accompanying notes 51-69.
[11] For a discussion of the lack of judicial guidance. see infra note 72.
[12] See Atwood, supra note 3, at 301. For a comprehensive review of the history of Customs'
administration of the laws dealing with parallel imports, see Vwitar, 593 F. Supp. at 428-32.
[131 Supnik, supra note 5, at 16.
[14] It has been argued that the problem of gray market imports should not be considered in
terms of trademark theory. See Dam, Trademarks, Price Discrimination and the Bureau of
Customs, 57 Trade-Mark Rep. 14, 31 (1967) ("[Ilt should be clearly recognized that trademark law
has no relevance in import cases."). Parallel imports are, however, a form of trademark infringement and should be treated as such. See infra text accompanying notes 79-113.
[15] Tariff Act of 1930, § 526(a). 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982) [hereinafter cited as section 526].
Section 526 provides:
[I]t shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of foreign
manufacture [which] bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or a corporation or
association created or organized within, the United States, and registered fin a
specific manner] unless written consent of the owner of such trademark is produced
at the time of making entry.
[16] Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, § 42, 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
section 42]. Section 42 provides:
[N]o article of imported merchandise which shall copy or simulate ... a trademark
registered in accordance with the [law] ... shall be admitted to entry at any
customhouse of the United States.
[17] For the text of the Customs Services current set of regulations implementing section 526
and section 42. see infra text accompanying note 73.
[18] Goodwill is a term of art and generally describes the intangible advantage that an owner
obtains through the success of the trademark. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248
U.S. 90 (1918); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
[19] 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982). The distributor as well as the manufacturer of a product may
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own and enjoy the protection of the trademark that the product carries. See Menendez v. Holt.
1q8 U.S. 514. 520 (1888); McLean v. Fleming. 96 U.S. 245. 254 (1877).
[201 Scandinavia Beltng Co.. 257 F. at 941.
[211 S. Rep. No. 1333. 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4. reprintedin 1946 U.S. Code Cong. & Serv. 1274.
1275 [hereinafter cited as Senate Comm. on Patents].
1221 Note. Trade-,nark Infringement: The Power of an American Trade-mark Owner to Prevent
the Importaton of the Authentic Product Manufactured by a Foreign Compan'. 64 Yale LJ. 557.
561-62 (1955).
[231 ld at 562: see also Senate Comm. on Patents. supra note 21. at 1274 ("iThe public ...
may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably
knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get.")
[241 See. e.g., Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson. 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928) (court enjoined use
of Yale trademark by maker of flashlights and batteries not holding trademark).
[251 See supra note 18: see also J. McCarthy. Trademarks and Unfair Competition. §§ 2:7-8
(2d ed. 1984) (trademark owner establishes goodwill through the use of advertising and warranty
services).
[261 Senate Comm. on Patents. supra note 21. at 1274: see also Prestonettes. Inc. v. Coty. 264
U.S. 359. 368 (1923) ("[A] trademark only gives the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to
protect the owner's goodwill against the sale of another's product as his."): United Drug. 248 U.S.
at 97 ("[TIhe law of trademarks is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition.").
[27] Bell & Howell. 548 F. Supp. at 1069.
128] See Senate Comm. on Patents. supra note 21. at 1274 ("Trademarks, indeed, are the
essence of competition, because they make possible a choice between competing articles by
enabling the buyer to distinguish one from the other."). But see Diggins. Trademarks and
Restraintsof Trade. 32 Geo. LJ. 113 (1944) (arguing that trademark protection gives the owner of
the mark what amounts to a legal monopoly). Courts have recognized that the protection of
trademarks creates a legal monopoly for the mark owner but have stressed the well established
public policy in favor of their protection. See Le Blume Import Co. v. Coty. 293 F. 344. 349 (2d
Cir. 1923). Courts will enforce trademark protection so long as the accompanying restraint of
trade is not unreasonable. See. e.g.. Osai'a, 589 F. Supp. at 1176 (suggesting that the use of
trademark rights to effect an unreasonable restraint of trade is prohibited by the antitrust laws).
[29] Handler, Trademarks - Assets or Liabilities?.48 Trade-Mark Rep. 661. 676 (1958).
130] Note, supra note 22. at 565.
[311 Id.
[32) 27 F. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886). It is well settled that this opinion established the principle
of universality. Supnick, supra note 5. at 5.
[331 Appollinarts. 27 F. at 21. The court theorized that since the defendant was selling the
genuine product as identified by the trademark, the public was not being deceived and thus there
was no infringement of the mark.
[341 Osaira.589 F. Supp. at 1171: see also Derenberg. TerritorialScope & Stits of Trademarks
and Good Will, 47 Va. L Rev. 733. 734 (1961) (Trademarks were considered an "outgrowth of a
right of personality which was deemed to be so closely associated with the person of their first
user that they were held entitled to universal protection beyond the frontiers of the country of
origin.") [hereinafter cited as TerritorialScopeI.
[351 Atwood. supra note 3. at 303.
[361 Osaiva, 589 F. Supp. at 1172.
[371 Id.
[381 Id. For a discussion of how separate goodwill is developed, see tnfra text accompanying
notes 84-94.
[39] 260 U.S. 689 (1923). For other cases applying the universality principle, see Hunyadi
Janos Cdrp. v. Stoeger. 285 F. 861 (2d Cir. 1922): Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening. 238 F. 780
(2d Cir. 1916); Russia Cement Co. v. Frauenhar 133 F. 518 (2d Cir. 1904).
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[40] A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 274 F. 856, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
[41] Id.
[42] Id.
[43] Id.
[44] Id. at 858.
[45] Bell & Howell, 548 F- Supp. at 1066; Supnik, supra note 5, at 7.
[46] Katzel, 260 U.S. at 692 ("[lIt is the trademark of the plaintiff only in the United States,
and indicates in law and ...by public understanding, that the goods come from the plaintiff
although not made by it.")
[47] Id. Under the territoriality principle of trademark protection, "the trademark and the
goodwill symbolized by it may have a separate legal existence in different parts of the world and,
therefore, [are] subject to territorial assignment and ...have a "situs' in more than one country."
TerritorialScope supra note 34, at 734.
[48] Batteries,supra note 2, at 7; see also Ingenohl v. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S. 541, 544 (1927)
("A trademark started elsewhere would depend for its protection in [another country] upon the
law prevailing in [that country] and would confer no rights except by the consent of that law.").
[49] Batteries,supra note 2. at 7; see also Osawa. 589 F. Supp. at 1171-72, where the court
recognized that:
[A trademark's] proper lawful function is not necessarily to specify the origin or
manufacture of a good (although it may incidentally do that), but rather to
symbolize the domestic goodwill of the domestic markholder so that the consuming
public may rely with an expectation of consistency on the domestic reputation
earned for the mark by its owner, and the owner of the mark may be confident that
his goodwill and reputation (the value of the mark) will not be injured through the
use of the mark by others in domestic commerce.
Compare TerritorialScope, supra note 34. at 746 (where the domestic owner of the mark "has
made no investment of his own in creating a new market and goodwill ...the territorial
trademark rights must be deemed to have remained exclusively with the foreign supplier and no
additional situs of goodwill [will] have been created.") with Takamatsu, supra note 4, at 456
(principle of territoriality is nothing more than a conflict of law doctrine).
[50] For cases applying the principle of territoriality, see Quabaug Rubber Co. v. Fabiano
Shoe Co., 567 F.2d 154 (1st Cir. 1977) (dictum); Perry v. American Hecolite Denture Corp., 78
F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1935). In the 1950's. however, some commentators took the view that goodwill
associated with a trademark could only have as its situs the country where the goods were made.
See, e.g., Vandenburgh, The Problem of Importation of Genuinely"Marked Goods, 49 Trade-Mark
Rep. 707 (1959); Callman, Worldmarks and the Antitrust Law, 11 Vand. L. Rev. 515 (1958).
[51] For the text of the section 526, see supra note 15.
[52] See infra text accompanying notes 54-59.
[53] The legislative history consisted of only ten minutes of floor debate. 62 Cong. Rec.
11602-05 (Aug. 19, 1922), and a conference report, H.R. Rep. No. 1223, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., 158.
[54] Vandenburgh, supra note 50, at 711 ("Had the Supreme Court reversed earlier, Congress
might not have sought to remedy the situation by legislation."); see also Coty, Inc. v. Le Blume
Import Co., 292 F. 264, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1922), aff'd., 293 F. 344 (2d Cir. 1923); Atwood, supra
note 3. at 316.
[55] See Atwood, supra note 3, at 316.
[56] Supplemental Memorandum for 47th Street Photo, Inc., In Opposition to Plaintiff-s
Motion for Summary Judgment 18-19, Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (emphasis added).
[57] Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc., 48 F.2d 1035, 1037 (2d Cir. 1931) (applied the language of
the section to prohibit the importation of a foreign car for the importer's personal use).
[58] Brief of Appellant Vivitar Corp. at 19. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed.
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Cir. 1985) (quoting 62 Cong. Rec. 11603 (August 19. 1922)) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Appellant
Vivitar].
1591 Id. at 15.
160] For the text of section 42, see supra note 16.
[611 16 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982).
1621 See supra note 3.
[631 See A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge. 263 U.S. 675 (1923) (per curiam). But see Coalition.
598 F. Supp. at 848 ("IS]ection 42 ... clearly applies only to merchandise bearing counterfeit or
spurious trademarks ... "); Kuhn. Remedies Available at Customs for Infringement of a Registered
Tradeniark. 70 Trade-Mark Rep. 387, 388 n.4 (1980) ("ITlo the extent that there is a statute
barring the admission of genuine goods, it is Section 526(a), and not Section 42.")
[64] Callman. Unfair Competition with Imported TrademarkedGoods, 43 Va. L. Rev. 323. 325
(1957).
[651 Compare section 526 (affords protection to a trademark "owned by a citizen of. or by a
corporation or association created or organized within, the United States") with section 42
(affords protection to "any domestic ... manufacturer or trader, or [to] any [foreign] manufacturer or trader.")
[661 Section 526, supra note 15.
[671 See 19 U.S.C. § 1526(c) (1982).
[68] Callman. supra note 64, at 325. One commentator has noted that prior to the enactment
of section 42. all of the reports on trademark bills which resulted in the Lanham Act called for the
repeal of section 526 and the inclusion of its provisions in section 42. Instead, "section 42 [is]
merely a reenactment of section 27 of the [Trademark] Act of 1905." Atwood. supra note 3. at
306.
[69] Atwood. supra note 3. at 322.
[70] See supra text accompanying notes 51-69.
[71] There has been no meaningful judicial guidance since the Supreme Court's decision in
Kat:el. 260 U.S. at 689. It has been argued that United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77
(S.D.N.Y. 1957). vacated. 358 U.S. 915 (1958), provides substantial guidance as to the scope of
section 526. Atwood, supra note 3, at 307. In Guerlain. the district court found that the use of
Section 526 to exclude parallel imports by a U.S. trademark registrant closely associated with the
foreign trademark owner constituted a monopolization of trade prohibited under section 2 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. 155 F. Supp. at 91. Yet, after successful prosecution of its case, the
Government moved for the Supreme Court to vacate the judgment, which would allow it to move
for dismissal on remand. The Government did so on the premise that a pending piece of
legislation would be enacted. The bill would have repealed section 526, revised section 42. and
clarified that trademark protection from parallel imports would not be available to a U.S.
trademark registrant related to its foreign counterpart. H.R. 7234, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.. 105 Cong.
Rec. 8540 (1959). This legislation, however, was never enacted. In light of these circumstances
surrounding the district court's opinion, reliance upon the opinion for judicial guidance is at best
misguided. O'Connor v. Donaldson , 422 U.S. 563. 577-78 n.12 (1975) (when the Supreme Court
vacates the decision of a lower court, it "deprives that court's opinion of precedential effect.")
[721 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c) (1985). For purposes of this provision "common ownership and
control" are defined in the Customs regulations as the following:
(1) "Common ownership" means individual or aggregate ownership of more than 50
percent of the business entity; and
(2) "Common control" means effective control in policy and operations and is not
necessarily synonymous with common ownership.
19 C.F.R. § 133.2(d) (1985).
173] Kuhn. supra note 63, at 394. It should be noted that the Customs remedies are not
exclusive and that post-importation remedies are available, such as an action for trademark
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infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982) (if the likelihood of confusion may be proven), unfair
competition actions under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (if the effect or tendency to
substantially injure the industry may be proven), or a suit for breach of contract (assuming that
the foreign mark holder is the gray market importer). Id. at 387.
[74] See 19 C.F.R. §§ 133.2(c), (d) (1984): see also Atwood. supra note 3. at 315 (suggesting
that the registrant's attorneys can rearrange corporate structure or ownership of the trademark in
order to meet Customs' requirement for protection).
[75] When a mark is registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the
owner of a trademark that is also applied abroad should record the mark with the Customs Service
to avail itself of the added protection of section 526 and section 42. Kuhn, supra note 63, at 404.
[76] 19 C.F.R. § 133.2(d) (1985).
177] Third parties may advise the Entry, Licensing, and Restrictive Merchandise Section of the
Customs Service of the possibility of misrepresentations. If. after a review of the application for
recordation, the Service determines that the applicant has misrepresented its relations with the
foreign mark owner, the importation of parallel goods will not be barred. Kuhn, supra note 63. at
397.
[78] See Note, supra note 22, at 567.
[79] Id.
[80] Bell & Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1066.
[81] See Note, supra note 22, at 562 n.2.
[82] Supnik, supra note 5, at 16.
[83] Batteries, supra note 2, at 3 (additional views of Vice Chairman Liebeler).
[841 See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
[851 See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
[86] For the relevant definition of control, see supra note 72.
[87] See, eg., Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1166.
[88] See generally Donegan. Importation of Trademarked Articles: The Case of the Interloping
Importer, 50 Trade-Mark Rep. 1035, 1052 (1960) (in light of the modern complexities of product
distribution. "a genuine article connotes not only the source of manufacturer ... but also the
chain of selection, distribution and servicing upon which [the consumer] has been able to rely in
the past.")
[89] It should be noted that the U.S. trademark owner is unable to prevent the sale of genuine
goods to gray market importers through contractual mechanisms. Once the goods leave the control
of the foreign owner of the mark, the trademark doctrine of exhaustion applies. See Prestonettes,
264 U.S. at 359. The foreign owner is, therefore, unable to prevent third parties from selling the
goods to unauthorized U.S. importers. See generally, 3A R. Callman. The Law of Unfair
Competition, Trademarks, and Monopolies § 21.17 (4th ed. 1983). Any contract between the
foreign and U.S. trademark owners prohibiting such sales would be impossible to enforce. See
Brief of Appellant Vivitar, supra note 58, at 5.
[90] Batteries,supra note 2, at 7-8 (additional views of Vice Chairman Liebeler).
[91] See Bell & Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1079; Batteries,supra note 2, at 7-8 (additional views
of Vice Chairman Liebeler); see also Supnik, supra note 5. at 8-9.
[92] For example, Vivitar claims that it loses 10 percent of its U.S. sales or 10 million dollars
each year to parallel imports. Brief of Appellant Vivitar, supra note 58, at 5.
[93] Batteries,supra note 2. at 40; see also Atwood, supra note 3. at 308 ("It cannot be denied
that a third party who purchases merchandise abroad, then imports it and sells it in competition
with the American trademark registrant. gets the benefit of free advertising in the American
market.").
[94] 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
[95] Id. at 1164.
[96] Id.
[97] Id. at 1174.
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[98] Id. at 1166. Other public relations activities used by Osawa included free seminars to
educate its customers about the complex capabilities of its products. rebates, and free equipment
to purchasers.
[99] The court noted that B.&H.'s advertising emphasized price and did nothing to support the
reputation of the Mamiya trademark. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1167: see also Brief of Appellant
Vivitar, supra note 58, at 4 n.3 (advertising for gray market goods usually emphasizes price and
relies on the established reputation of the trademark to establish quality).
[100] In an attempt to avoid "consumer confusion, disaffection, and resentment, [Osawa] has
performed warranty repairs ... on the gray market cameras." Osawa. 589 F. Supp. at 1168. The
court rejected B.&H.'s offer to place warranties on the cameras that it sells because B.&H. would
have no incentive to perform such an obligation properly since it has no stake in preserving the
goodwill of the mark. Id. at 1169.
[101] Id. at 1168.
[1021 Id. at 1167.
[103] Id. at 1168. Osawa is left with the choice of providing free warranty services on the gray
market cameras, thereby subsidizing B.&H.'s business, or suffering damage to the goodwill of its
mark. Id. at 1169. Gray market imports also damage the mark's reputation among the authorized
dealers for the product. See Callman, supra note 89. at § 22.17 n.7.
[104] See supra text accompanying notes 85-89.
[105) Thomas. Licensing and Importing Under Trademarks, 49 Trade-Mark Rep. 1245. 1254
(1959).
[106] Truck Equipment Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp.. 536 F.2d 1210. 1215 (8th Cir.). cert
denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); see also American Hecolite, 78 F.2d at 561 (an importer who has no
enforceable trademark right but who had established a substantial goodwill is entitled to
protection against another importer who sold the genuine product "on the plaintiff's reputation
and standing").
[1071 See Batteries,supra note 2, at 4 (additional views of Vice Chairman Liebeler).
[108] See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
[109] Batteries,supra note 2. at 3-4 (additional views of Vice Chairman Liebeler).
[110] Id. at 9 (additional views of Vice Chairman Liebeler). Although certain post-importation
remedies are available, the trademark owner may not always be able to take advantage of the
relief they provide. See supra note 74. Moreover, this relief is usually only obtained after a lengthy
judicial or administrative proceeding. Given the uncertainty of relief and the expense of the
necessary litigation, the owner of the mark will eventually confront a cost-benefit analysis that no
longer favors the investment required to establish a trademark.
[111 Batteries,supra note 2. at 9 (additional views of Vice Chairman Liebeler).
[1121 Id.: see also Federal Trade Comm.. FTC Office of Policy Planing. The Craswell Report,
Trademarks. Consumer Information and Barriers to Competition (1979) at 7:
If there were no trademarks ... a manufacturer would gain little or nothing from
improving his product's quality. Consumers would be unable to recognize high-or
low-quality brands, so sales would tend to go to manufacturers who reduced their
price by cutting corners on quality. The result would be a race to produce inferior
products, rather than competition to produce better ones.
[113] 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
[114] Bell & Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1068: see also Kuhn. supra note 63. at 393 ("[T]he
Customs Service should not be the vehicle of a trademark owner to implement monopolistic
control over the distribution of trademarked goods in this country:'). This restraint of trade
rationale has also been used in the European Economic Community to prevent the exclusion of
parallel imports by related companies. See Takamatsu. supra note 4. at 440-52. But see
Waelbroeck, The Effect of the Rome Treai , on the Exercise of National Industrial Property Rights,
21 Antitrust Bull. 99. 113-24 (1976) (decisions of the European Court of Justice Prohibiting the
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use of trademarks to restrain the movement of goods by related companies jeopardizes the
function of trademark protection); Mann, IndustrialProperty and the E.E.C. Treat),. 24 Int'l. &
Comp. L.Q. 31, 37 (1975) ("[T]he right of the [trademark] owner to prevent the importation of
infringing goods cannot possibly by defined as a disguised qualitative restraint on trade .
[115] See Note, supra note 22 at 562; see also Atwood, supra note 3, at 303 ("Different arms
of the same company should not be able to maintain two separate price structures for the same
product, one price being above that which the market would seek if importers could compete
freely.").
[116] See Bicks, Antitrust and Trademark Protection Concepts in the Import Field, 49 TradeMark Rep. 1255, 1260-61 (1959) ("iThere is ... no sound reason for giving these affiliated
companies the special and drastic privilege of being able to set prices in the United States without
fear of any competition from the resale of the products by those who have purchased them
abroad.").
[117] 575 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
[118] Id. at 418.
[119] Id. at 419-20. The court found that the importation of parallel goods enables consumers
to benefit from lower prices. Id. at 416.
[120] See Hoffman, A Stud, of the Question Whether Existing Statutes Should Be Amended to
Eliminate Present Customs Regulations Excluding From Import Restrictions hnported Articles
Bearing Recorded Trademarks on Trade Names Applied Abroad By or With the Authority of the
United States Owners, 1978 A.B.A. Sec. Pat. Trade-Mark Copyright L. Rep. 76 (Customs should
not be used as an "agency of antitrust enforcement").
[121] Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1177. Contra Atwood. supra note 3, at 309. The regulations are
based on the antitrust rational used in the judicial decision in Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at 77. See
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
at 42. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States, 598 F. Supp.
344 (D.D.C. 1984) (quoting letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to seven United States
senators (Dec. 23, 1983)) [hereinafter cited as Coalition Memorandum]. Considering the lack of
precedential value of the opinion in Guerlain, the use of that district court decision as the basis of
the current regulations is unwarranted. See supra note 72.
[122] Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1177 ("Antitrust questions are far too complex to be reasonably
decided by reference to [Customs'I short questionnaire on corporate ownership.").
[123] See Hoffman, supra note 121, at 76.
[124] Id.
[125] Coalition Memorandum, supra note 121, at 42.
[126] In United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377. 393 (1956), the
Supreme Court stated:
[O]ne can theorize that we have monopolistic competition in every non-standardized
commodity with each manufacturer having power over the price and production of
his own product. However, this power that, let us say, automobile or soft drink
manufacturers have over their trademark products is not the power that makes an
illegal monopoly. Illegal power must be appraised in terms of the competitive
market for the product.
[127] See Handler, supra note 29, at 672; see also Derenberg, CurrentTrademark Problems in
Foreign Travel and the Import Trade, 49 Trade-Mark Rep. 674, 705-06 (1959). As Professor
Derenberg stated:
We should realize that we are still far away from "one world" or even a hemispheric
"common market" so that certain restrictive practices and commercial operations
which, if affecting only certain geographical areas within the territory of he United
States, might fall within the ban of the antitrust laws, should not without more be
similarly outlawed in the foreign trade area.
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Id.
The Supreme Court has ruled that any vertical restraint of trade that results from a firm
restricting the distribution of its own product is subject to the antitrust rule of reason. Continental
T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
[128] Handler. supra note 29., at 672. In addition. U.S. courts have limited the extraterritorial
reach of U.S. antitrust laws when sensitive foreign issues are involved. See Mannington Mills, Inc.
v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America.
549 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1976).
1129] See Joint Amicus Curiae Brief filed on behalf of the United States by the U.S.
Department of Justice and the U.S. Customs Service at 16, Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel
Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1983), reprinted in Joint Appendix at 79. Vivitar Corp. v.
United States. 761 F.2d 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Amicus Curiae Brief - Bell &
Howell].
1130] Customs' approach establishes a per se rule in that any exclusion of genuine goods by
related companies is in a sense considered a per se antitrust violation. In general, the future of the
per se rule in antitrust law has been under increasing scrutiny. See Jefferson Parish Hospital
District v. Hyde, 104 S.Ct. 1551 (1984).
[1311 See Osawa. 589 F. Supp. at 1178.
1132] Id, see also infra note 149.
[133] Supnik, supra note 5. at 9.
[134] Atwood. supra note 3. at 305-06.
[135] Id. at 316.
[136] 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l. Trade 1984). affd 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
[137] 593 F. Supp. at 422-23.
[1381 Id. at 423.
[139] Id. at 422.
[140] Id. at 435.
[141] Id. at 431.
11421 761 F.2d at 1569.
1143] Id. at 1569-70.
[144] Id. at 1570.
[145] See Brief of Appellant Vivitar, supra note 58. at 10.
11461 Amicus Curiae Brief - Bell & Howell, supra note 129. at 7-8.
[147] Id.
[148] Kuhn, supra note 63. at 394 (raises the question of whether the regulations are ultra
vires).
An importer of excluded goods is not without recourse. Importers may bring suit to challenge
either the validity or ownership of the trademark, Coty, 293 F. at 269 (Section 526 was "not
meant to prevent a person ... from testing the trademark in the courts.") The importer also has
the option of removing the infringed mark from the goods, but this is not an attractive option to
gray market importers who benefit from the goodwill that the mark represents. See supra text
accompanying notes 93-94.
[149] Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1175 ("The old universality cases and the theory upon which
they rest represent an incorrect analysis that has been rewarded in both statutory and decisional
law, at least where the domestic markholder has developed an independent goodwill.").
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